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3Fpbrttarg rtly. 19121 

So 

Edward L. Anderson, Captain 52nd O* V.* I. 






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1^ 






COLONEL ARCHIBALD GRACIE'S 

THE TRUTH ABOUT CHICKAMAUGA. 

A Rei'iezv by Edzvard L. Anderson, Captain o2nd Ohio, 

Adjutant McCook's Brigade. 

Mr. President and Companions : 

I have had the honor of being invited to address you, this 
evening, upon a work of great significance ; one which will give 
surprise to those who derive their ideas of the great Battle of 
Chickarnauga from tradition and unsupported statements, but 
which will be recognized by those who were participants in the 
engagement as containing much of, if not the whole truth re- 
garding the events of September 19th and 20th, 1863, when the 
Army of the Cumberland and the Confederates under Bragg 
measured swords in one of the fiercest contests of modern times. 
The author of this work, a son of the late Brigadier General 
(jracie. Confederate Army, assures us that he undertook the 
self-imposed task, without much knowledge of his subject and 
without prejudice, because in his visits to the battlefield, in 
memory of his gallant father, he found so many contradictory 
statements from misinformed reporters, and such conflicting 
witnesses in the monuments, that he determined to see how nearly 
he could b;\ing into harmony the differing credible representa- 
tions, by seeking information upon every point from both the 
Federal and Confederate side. 

'"The tribunal to whose decision the truth * * =f^ jg j.g_ 
ferred, after exhaustive and impartial study, is the Official Re- 
ports, which constitute the Court of Last Resort, cited in the 
text herewith, and supplemented by references to those author- 
itative sources in "jXotes" following thereafter, which will be 
found of special interest." (paie viii.) 

r 



The greater part of the book is given up to discussing the 
four or fi^^e last hours of the engagement, so that in a review 
of the work in question, we must pass over the battles of the ll»th 
of September and the early part of the *30th, with an account of 
these events in a brief manner, detailed enough only to make as 
clear as possible the movements and their results from noon of 
the second day. 

In the hurly-burly of the series of fights which then took 
place, often by mere groups of our separated and divided com- 
mands, where there was much borrowing of squads, regiments 
and brigades as various points required support at moments of 
supreme importance, the author of "The Truth About Chica- 
mauga" met with very great difificulties. Each officer naturally 
and loyally made the best possiblt record for his troops in the 
last stand before the withdrawal from the field, which re]>orts 
Colonel (Iracie assumes were generalK- intended to be fair and 
truthful, except in the instances where lie pillories the oft'enders 
in his criticisms. 

One, and not the least of these difficulties in reconciling the 
conflicting statements into some kind of accord, is the fact that 
upon nearly every important aft'air the given time dift'ers, often, 
by hours. 

"I have found another check upon the accuracy ot my work. 
I have followed out the movements of each corps; then the move- 
ments of each division of each and every corps ; and finally, the 
movements of every regiment, battalion, and batter\- of each 
brigade mi every division ; and, where the imits of organization 
have dovetailed perfectly. 1 have obtained, 1 think, a mathema- 

2 



Gii'l 
Publifber 



tical demonstration in nianr instatiGes of the accuracy of the 
work. After one has accomplished the chimerical task which I 
have sug-gested, he may claim to know something about the truth 
of this most wonderful battle. 

In consequence of this work of niine, I claim respect for 
the accuracy of the premises on which my conclusions are based, 
for the truth of which the Official Reports are responsible, and 
with which these conclusions square." (page 35.) 

To those who thoughtlessly ask, "Why should not the story 
of th: battle, now more or less generally accepted, be permitted 
to rest, or the whole affair allowed to pass into oblivion?", it 
should be explained that to juggle with or to suppress historical 
facts is a crime that has a much wider influence for evil than 
is thought to prevail by such weaklings. 

The first cha])ter of (iracie's book is given to the "Elimina- 
tion of False History," and here the author undertakes to prove 
by the Official Reports that Chickamauga was not fought by 
Rosecrans for the possession or the holding of the City of 
Chattanooga, but for the destruction of L>ragg's troops and the 
control of a large region occupied by the Confederates. Such 
objects were within the rights of an invading army; but as 
Chattanooga was peacefully taken ten days before September 
19th, and was in a favorable position for defense, as was after- 
wards proved, it was absurd for Rosecrans to assert that the 
' attle was fo',i^:ht for its permanent possession, a theory that 
'C^dme t'' his mind later ■'.hen. after admitting defeat, he claimed 
that the object of his campaign was attained, and that Chicka- 
mauga was a great Federal Victory. 

3 



The fact is that Rosocrans by a scries of masterly move- 
ments had forced the Confederates to withdraw from Chatta- 
noogia, and that after this was accomplished he lost his skill, 
and deceived by Bragg's clever stratagems believed that the 
Confederate forces were flying before him, a disorganized 
rabble seeking safety in flight. 

Rosecrans' eyes were opened on September 12th, when he 
was confident that Bragg's army was concentrated about Lafay- 
ette, an easy march from the captured city. Then he hurriedly 
brought his weary and scattered corps into the unknown recesses 
of a tangled forest to face a brave and prepared foe. 

"I doubt if there can be found recorded anywhere in the 
history of a great battle, an instance where any army was more 
completely deceived than was the Federal Army by the strata- 
gems employed by General t>ragg during the four davs ending 
September l'?th." (Gracie page '?<>.) 

For four days the opportunity was given Bragg of attack- 
ing one of Rosecrans' corps with a much superior force, before it 
could receive aid from either of the others, and the neglect of 
doing so is one of those mysteries that envelope the story of 
Chickamauga; another, no less important in its bearing, is Long- 
street calling a halt on the evening of September '^Oth, when the 
retreating forces of Thomas, lying at his mercy, were permitted 
to withdraw undisturbed. Of course it will be said., in accord 
with Granger's afterthought, that Bragg's army had suffered 
great losses in the battle of two days ; but no successful troops 
would have refused to march a few miles, no matter what losses 
had been sustained, if they saw a complete victory before them. 

4 



Upon the 18th of September, Col. Dan McCook was ordered, 
with his brigade and the G9th Ohio, to make a reconnaissance 
towards Reed's bridge, on the Chickamauga River, at the north- 
east corner of what afterwards proved to be the battlefield, and 
that he should destroy that structure should he be able to do so 
without bringing on a general engagament. Col. JMcCook'si com- 
mand arrived at dark within a mile of the bridge, when his 
skirmishers came upon the rear of McNair's brigade, of Bushrod 
Johnson's Division, which was passing along a road crossing his 
front. x\bout twenty stragglers were picked up, without creat- 
ing any disturbance, and, after a short time of quiet, the 69th 
Ohio was sent forward and succeeded in firing the bridge, which 
as it was afterwards proved was only scorched. At daylight on 
September 19th. the enemy opened with small arms and artillery 
upon McCooks" men, who had passed the night lying upon their 
arms, without fires, upon which Colonel McCook, following his 
previous orders, and, a peremptory order having been received 
before any great losses on his part, marched his command back 
towards Rossville. Upon reaching th^' point where the head of 
his command struck the Lafayette Road, Genera! Brannan was 
met ( Croxton's brigade in advance), in column without advance 
guards. McCook called out to Brannan that he had a rebel 
l^rigade penned up in a bend of the river near Jay's saw mill, 
with the bridge in its rear destroyed. General Thomas reports 
tliat McCook gave him the same information at Baird's head- 
quarters. 

Immediatily upon the receipt of Colonel McCook's report, 
General Thoiuas sent Brannan, followed by Baird, eastwardly 
towards Reed's bridge and the neighboring saw-mill with a view 

5 



to capturing the brigade which was penned up in the bend of the 
Chickamauga River. This episode is described at some length 
on account of the very important events which followed it as a 
matter of course. The fact was that the emcmiy was in great 
force about the points mentioned and towards Alexander's 
Bridge. The divisions of Brannan and Baird were soon hotly 
engaged and the battle of the IDth of September was begun past 
recall. Besides the divisions of Brannan and Reynolds, General 
Thomas had those of Johnson, Palmer, Van Cleve and Davis, 
long before midday. Croxton of Brannan's division and Van- 
Derveer of Baird's, after a number of sharp contests, had pushed 
their wav to within half a mile of Jay's saw mill. IJaird and 
Brannan maintained the unequal fight for at least two hours when 
Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds came to their assistance. All 
day the battle raged with varying fortunes ; sometimes in long 
lines, sometimes by small commands, until before night every 
division in the Army of the Cumberland was represented on 
the fighting front. At dark Johnson's division alone remained in 
advance at D. C. Reed's farm where it was fiercely attacked 
and for a time the line gave w^ay, but rallied and held its ground 
after great losses, until the firing ceased ; when it, with other 
divisions took positions in a line west of the ground fought 
over, and the battle of Se])tenil)er IDtli ceased. 

As has been stated, in a review of the book in question. 
we are not concerned about the battles of the IDth of September 
and the first half of the '30th, further than to give us an under- 
standable perspective of the whole field for both davs. Xor are 
there many points of imi:)ortance in dispute before the arrival of 
Granger's Reserve Corps and the withdrawal of the whole of 
Thomas' command to Rossville. 



From about noon of Saturday up to eleven o'clock on 
Sunday Rosecrans' headquarters were at the Widow Glenn's 
house on the Crawfish Springs Road. Here late on the night of 
the 19th the Commander of the Army of the Cumberland had a 
consultation with his Corps Commanders regarding the arrange- 
ments of the lines for the next day. With some slight changes 
the plan was adhered to with the following result : 

Sheridan's division (20 A. C.) was posted on the extreme 
right at Widow Glenns. Davis (20 A. C.) was placed on Sher- 
idan's left, his line extending to the south-east corner of Dyer's 
Field. Wood (21 A. C.) was on Davis' left, and Brannan's (14 
A. C.) division on the left of Wood reached the Lafayette Road, 
north of the Poe house. \'an Cleve's division was in rear of 
Wood and P>rannan. There was a break in the line, as Reynold's 
right was in echelon four hundred yards in front of Brannan's 
left. Reynolds (14 A. C. ) Palmer (21 A. C. ) Johnson (20 A. 
C. ) and Baird (14 A. C.) had their divisions in that order, around 
and east of Kelly's Field. The brigade of John Beatty was on 
Baird's left. Stanley's behind Baird, Sirwell's with the reserve 
artillery in rear of the left wing, these last named tliree being 
of Negley's division ; this force being intended to guard the 
Lafayette Road from Bragg's formidable masses on his right, 
("iranger, with Steedman's division and Dan McCook's brigade 
of the Reserve Corps, was posted at McAfee's Church, about 
four miles from Thomas' left to watch the road from Ringgold, 
and to give aid to, or to receive aid from the main army as 
occasion might demand. 

The battle of September 20th opened by an attack upon our 
extreme left against John Beatty's thin line, which was driven 

7 



back upon Baird's troops, and this attack was repulsed. Stanley 
and the reserves of Johnson and Palmer drove back two Con- 
fcdfratc l^rii^adcs which had passed alonj;- the west side of the 
Lafayette Road in an effort to reach the h^ederal rear. Haird, 
Johnson. Palmer and Reynolds and Negley's two bri^^ades re- 
pulsed many fierce assaults with steadiness and determination. 
The rigiit wiui^ of a Confederate brigade, its left held in ch.^ck, 
slipped by to Kelly's field, when it was met and routed by Vru 
Derveer and W'illich, who always seemed to be on hand when 
wanted. 

The Q'reater part of Thomas' l?ft winp: was somewhat pro- 
tected by a rude barricade of logs and rails which aided the 
troops in resistinc^ the terrible fire of the enem\'. This slight 
hue encouraging- defence originated with Hazen, who throughout 
the whole day exhibited such skill, courage and perseverance as 
marked him as one of the most efficient officers in the army. Pre- 
viously to the withdrawal of Wood from the main line Ilrannan 
was fiercely attacked in Poe's Field, but the enemv was driven 
from his front by an enfilading fire from the divisions of ]'ie\'no!ds 
and I 'aimer. 

We now come to a ver\- important phas.^ of the battle, one 
that threatened the early defeat and dcstriiction of the whole 
Army of the Cumberland. 

AlxHit eleven o'clock Wood's division was withdrawing-, 
under misunderstood orders, to assist Reynolds, who was on 
I>rannan's left where there was the break in the line as described. 
I'cfore Wood had wholI_\' passed from his jiosition two divisions 
of the enem\- broke throug^h the gap ; one of these passing north- 

8 



wardly, crumpled up Brannan's division and all the troops in its 
rear ; the other bod\' of the enemy driving the troops of Davis. 
Sheridan and Wilder in a wild rout that bore with them from 
the field the Generals Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden. The 
gallant Harker having escaped this attack returned with his 
brigade and for a time faced fearful odds, but very shortly these 
ready fighters with Brannan's nien and those of Buell and Sam 
Beatty, a scattered mass, were pursued until a stand could 
be made by Brannan, Harker and fragments of other commands 
upon the heights south of the Snodgrass House. 

General Thomas had nothing to do with posting the first line 
upon Horseshoe Ridge, as is proved by the official reports and 
the statements of all concerned. When Brannan, Wood and the 
commands in their rear were driven north from the vicinity of 
the Foe House and Dyer's field, Brannan's troops reformed upon 
the westerly point of the Horseshoe Ridge, while Wood posted 
Harker's brigade upon the easterly hill, in continuation of that 
providentially di^^covered s'tronghokr.; while Stoughton found 
refuge between Harker and P)rannan, and the oSth Indiana was 
placed between Connell's 8"3nd Indiana and Croxton. The 21st 
Ohio, a splendid regiment of Sirwell's brigade with oiJS men 
armed for the most part with Colt's repeating rifles, afterwards 
joined the right of Connell. When General Thomas arrived at 
the Horseshoe Ridge, from one to two o'clock, the line was as 
follows; 51st Ohio; 8'3nd Indiana; ITth Kentucky; 58th Indi- 
ana, Croxton, under Hays; 13th Ohio, Stoughton; i4th Indiana, 
Harker. 

We now employ literally Colonel Grade's words "Our 
standard of truth, from which we quote, plainly indicates that 



Thomas was the grandest figure of the [-"ederal AriTi\ ; a mon- 
ument of strength and inspiration to the courage of liis soldiers, 
who had rallied in the woods and on the heights to which ihey 
had Med, and where they had l:)een posted under the orders of 
their commanders, Generals Wood, Brannan and John lU^atty, 
and Colonels Harker, Stoughton, Hunter and Walker." 

"Here, from one to one and a half h:)urs, with a force of 
about 1500 fragments under Brannan and of at least 1"200 (care- 
fullv estimated) of the Iron I'rigade of Harker. including the 
12;")th Ohio, "Opdycke's Tigers," and Smith's four guns and 
eighty-three men of the 4th United States Battery, whilom fugi- 
tives most of them, whose courage was restored by the very pres- 
ence of Thomas, the pursuit was checked and the heights main- 
tained against that most formidable instrument of war, Ker- 
shaw's South Carolina l^>rigade. fresh from storming the heights 
of Gettysburg, and from victories on many hard fought fields, but 
none, according to their commander, more heavy than this. Ker- 
shaw's Brigade about I'^OO in action, with Colonel Oates' loth 
.Alabama Regiment, were the sole representatives that afternoon of 
"Long-street's \'irginia Army," in the assaults on Chickamauga 
] [eights ; yet these men, on the strength of their reputation, in- 
spired such terror that their numbers v/erj more than quadrupled 
by the imagination of their opponents. About 2 o'clock P. M., to 
Kershaw's support on his left came Anderson's strong and brave 
Mississii)pi IJrigade, of Hindman's Division: but still the heighls 
were held, the 21st Ohio Regiment, tlu- strongest in the b'ederal 
army, performing yeoiuan service at this juncture with its 
cfikient use of its five-chainbered Colt's revolving rifii'S. 

"Ilien followed the l)elated lUishrod Johnson, whosj time 

and energies had been wasted for l-.ours waiting for orders to 

advance his much-enduring hardfiT:hting Tennesseeans. 

' 10 ■ 



"This is the crucial moment and the die is cast. The 21st 
Ohio's thin hne at its middle had been thrown back Hke a gate 
on its hinges, in a vain attempt to finally resist the Confederate 
movement on Brannan's tlank. But fifteen minutes more and this 
rally on the heights would have been of no use, and Thomas' 
superb courage, famed in story, might never have been a theme 
of grandeur. Granger's Reserve Corps, without orders, march- 
ing an canon, a la Dcsaix a Marengo, had arrived on the field. 

"After reporting to General Thomas, General Steedman, of 
this corps, was ordeded to move his division into the three-quar- 
ter-mile gap between the two wings of the army. The Pre- 
paratory movement had been made, but before the final command 
of execution was given, the more immediate danger was seen 
in time. On the command "right face", Steedman marched west 
in rear of Brannan's line until the latter's right was reached, 
when first Whitaker's P)rigade and then Alitchell's were moved 
by the left flank. The division then charged up the heights, 
General Steedman performing the most conspicuous act of per- 
sonal courage recorded of any general officer on the Federal 
side, leading his men, most of them raw recruits, then for the 
first time in action, and, seizing the flag of the lloth Illinois, 
gained the crest and drove the Confederates down the southern 
slope of Missionary Ridge. 

".A.bout the time that Steedman's Division was thus put into 
action, another strong brigade of well-seasoned troops, under the 
comiuand of a Mexican War Veteran, Colonel Van Derveer, re- 
ported to General Thomas at the Snodgrass House, and were 
immediately placed in the front in one line on the crest, re- 
lieving Brannan's troops (then almost exhausted), and posted 
next to the 21st Ohio's left, which still defended this flank on 

Horseshoe Ridge. 

11 



"Ry this acquisition of 4112 fresh troops under Steedman 
and about 1200 under \'an Derveer, who had already rendered 
most creditable and opportune service on the h>deral left wing 
and rear, Thomas was now strong in numbers and his whole 
command well supplied with ammunition ; for another great ser- 
vice rendered by Steedman was the bringing up of ninety-five 
thousand extra rounds of ammunition to be distributed among 
r^rannan's and Harker's men, whose supply was nearly ex- 
hausted." 

The aspect of affairs on the heights was now completely 
changed, and the exultant Federals, who had been a few minutes 
before fighting in desperation, were reinforced with strength 
and courage like men who had won a victory. It was now that 
General Thomas resolved to hold his pt)sition and the army on 
the field until nightfall. Me made his preparations for the i)ur- 
pose l)v general distributions of ammunition among l)otli wings of 
his army. The Confederate division commanders on the left 
wing had received forcible knowledge of the material change in 
conditions by the arrival of reinforcements in support of the 
hitherto hard-pressed b^derals on the heights. They now got 
together for the first time. Ilindman and Johnson joined the 
brigades of their divisions with Kershaw's l)rigade for two 
successive assaults in desperate efiforts to gain the heights ; for 
up to this time distinctly noticeable is the lack of unity of action 
on the part of these Confederate generals, due to the absence of 
any orders whatever from their wing conmiander. General Long- 
street, and their inability to find him on this part of the field. 
Nay, more : questions of rank and precedence arose between 
them, which only General Longstreet's presence could have set- 
tled, and from 12 o'clock until now thev had p. died in opposite 

directions." 

12 



"Nothing could exceed the intensity and desperation of 
the successive assaults which now followed, made by these seven 
Confederate brigades in line. Hindman mentions the fact that on 
his "extreme left the bayonet was used, and men were also killed 
and wounded with clubbed muskets," while Kershaw on the right 
effected a momentary lodgment near the crest, which drove the 
Federals from the summit ; but the latter, rallying all their avail- 
able men, charged upon the South Carolinians whose colors were 
only saved by their bearer, who, after rece-iving a mortal wound, 
turned and threw the staff backward over the works into the 
hands of his comrades." 

"Tt was up to this time that Thomas, by virtue of his rank, 
used his discretion and held his men on the heights, by the ex- 
ample which he set them and the love which they bore towards 
him. His antagonist, Longstreet, who for the most part of his 
time until now had stationed himself in the woods in the rear 
of his right division, Stewart's, at this juncture, first emerged 
therefrom in time to witness from Dyer's field the last desperate 
assault of Kershaw. Preston's Division had at last been "pulled 
away from its mooring on the river bank" and had lieen ad- 
vanced, with his leading brigade in line facing north, bisected by 
the Lafayette Road, n?ar the Poe house, with his other two 
brigades immediately in rear, also in line. Longstreet now got 
into the action in Dyer's field with his last division, Preston's, the 
strongest of all, which he had held in reserve. He still re- 
mained blind to the opportunity which had existed at noon and 
all afternoon, plainly evident to the Federal generals. Wood, 
Thomas, Hazen, and others. Why was it that he did not order 
the whole of Preston's Division directly forward along the La- 

13 



fayette road, with Buckner's Reserve Artillery and the latter's 
other divisions, so as to fill the apparent gap of one half to three 
quarters of a mile between the Federal wings?" 

"Th-ere were in this same fringe of woods west of the 
Lafayette road, at this point,, four other Confederate brigades, 
none of which had moved since noontime. 1 fumphreys' 
^Mississippi Hrigade. formerly liarksdale's. which, under orders 
of the wing conunander. was anchored at the "blacksmith Shop" 
and made no assault in the battle, the men begging in vain to 
ji>in their comrades in the charge ; then there were the Texas 
Brigade of General Robertson, Law's Alabama Brigade under 
Colonel Sheffield, and the Georgia r>rigade under (General Ben- 
ning, all three under the command of General Law, comprising 
a part of Llood's famous division, then located "in line perpen- 
dicular to the road, to the left and slightly in advance of Preston, 
and close to the burned house (Poe's)." P)lin(l to his oppor- 
tunity and ignorant of the weakest point in his adversary's line 
which appears to have been a continued source of anxiety to 
General Thomas that afternoon, General Longstreet ordered only 
two brigades of Preston's to Dyer's field, leaving the other third 
of the division, Trigg's P>rig-ade, at Brotherton's, for protection 
against the enemy's cavalrv, supposed to be crossing the Chicka- 
mauga below Lte and Gordon's Mills, whom Trigg with two of his 
regiments "was sent IV^ miles back to intercept," on a perfectly 
useless reconnaissance, wasting valuable time and energy only to 
discover that the alL'ged enemy was "their own" Confederate 
General Wheeler's men. (iracie's and Kcllx's brigades were then 
ordered forward to the relief of Kershaw and .Vnderson in a 
final and successful effort to gain the Heights of Chickamauga, 

14 



and drive the enemy from his chosen stronghold, which was made 
the "keypoint" of the battle, first by the division commanders 
who followed the fugitives into the woods and mountain fast- 
nesses and finally by the action of Longstreet himself. 

"The assault of Gracie and Kelly had begun, preceded by "a 
deadly fire on the right and right rear of the forces in front of 
Stewart." The movement of this artillery, principally composed 
of the twenty- four guns of the Reserve Corps Artillery, and com- 
manded by Major Samuel C. Williams, was in General Buckner's 
special charge under General Longstreet's orders, but it was not 
until Gracie had gained the heights that Longstreet ordered 
lUickner's advance northward, with a battery of twelve guns with 
Stewart's Division following, Longstreet's object being not to 
drive this entering wedge between the two wings, so much as an 
effort to prevent the Federal left wing from reinforcing that part 
of their army which was posted on Horseshoe Ridge. Had 
Longstreet's orders to accomplish his object been given more 
promptly and more effectually executed, the reinforcement of 
Hazen's Brigade would not so opportunely have arrived in sup- 
port of Harker and Brannan, nor General Hazen been rewarded 
with a major-generalship's commission for his act, which saved 
both liarker and Brannan from capture or annihilation. But it 
was long before this that General Thomas' watchful eye and 
attentive ear, of the trained soldier, forewarned him of the ap- 
proaching storm and the danger to what he knew to be the weak- 
est point in his army's position. It was also at this juncture, 
about 4.30 P. AL, not later that he received the withdrawal order 
from General Rosecrans." 

"Heretofore, by reason of his being the ranking general on 

15 



the field of battle, in the absence of any order from the com- 
mander-in-chief, Thomas had, in accordance with his resolve, 
used his power of discretion and maintained Harker's and Bran- 
nan's fugitive fragments at their ])osition on the Horseshoe, as- 
sisted by the 21st (J)hio, generously loaned Brannan on his urgent 
request to General Negley, and had saved these men on the 
heights and the whole army from immediate destruction, until 
Steedman's and \'an Derveer's arrival. 

''Another crisis now ensues. At the actual and relative time 
of Gracio's advance in magnificent array, as recognized in the 
Official Reports of Federal ofificers on the Horseshoe and de- 
scribed with much admiration personally to the writer by some 
of them (General Boynton included among the number), General 
Thomas now received Rosecrans" first dispatch, directed to him- 
self, ordering withdrawal, and as proven bv thirty of our wit- 
nesses against the testimony of only one to the contrary, the 
evidence in fact being unanimous on the subject. General Thomas 
did not and could not dela}' one moment his obedience to the 
order, and forthwith dispatched his aid. Captain llarker, for 
Reynolds to make a beginning of the movement. ( )rders were 
also dispatched to the other left wing division commanders for 
their withdrawal successively. This was a wise move, to begin 
the withdrawal at this quarter, because of the more precarious 
situation on his left wing, whicli at tliis juncture was within a 
few hundred yards of being completelv enveloped b\ the Con- 
federate lines. 

"Thomas left the Snodgrass house before Gracie took pos- 
session of the heights, leaving (icneral Granger the onlv corjjs 
commander on the battle-field, and by virtue of his rank, in com- 

16 



mand of the troops under Harker and Brannan, as well as his 
own men under Steedman ; but Granger's personal departure 
seenis to have been timed by the very first indication of Con- 
federate success in driving Harker from the heights. Thus 
General Thomas "quit when ordered and because he was ordered." 
Meanwhile the withdrawal of Reynolds had already begun be- 
fore Barker's arrival with the order. General Reynolds is quoted 
as saying, in his position at the breastworks that his only alter- 
native was surrender. When his division reached the Lafayette 
road, General Thomas saw him. Putting himself at the head 
of Reynold's Division, General Thomas led his army in the 
movement of withdrawal. 

"As before mentioned, the Confederates had nearly en- 
veloped the Federal left wing; the front brigade of a division of 
the right wing had reached the vicinity of the Kellv house, 
passing in rear of the Federal divisions of Baird and Johnson. 
Thomas himself ordered the charge and the division cut its 
way out. At the same time the way was made clear for the 
escape of the other divisions of the Federal left wing, most of 
whom were retired in great disorder. 

"Reynolds, misunderstanding Thomas' order, moved straight 
along the Lafayette road toward the Rossville Gap, not halting 
with his section of the division until checked at Cloud Church 
by Forrest's cavalry, while Thomas, separating E. A. King's 
Brigade from the rest of the division, wheeled to the left near 
McDonald's house and reached a point of safety on the Ridge 
road at the head of McFarland's Gap'. Here he halted and 
sent his orders for the withdrawal of the rest of the army, 
which he had left on Chickamauga Heights, and which had been 

17 



driven therefrom before his order arrived. He thus obeyed to 
the letter General Rosecran's orders to withdraw. The most 
direct route of withdrawal to Rossvillc was by way of the La- 
fayette road and Rossville Gap but, in accordance with the word- 
ing of Rosccrans' order, he moved toward McFarland's Gap to 
"join his army with Crittenden and McCook," whose forces 
were then known to him to have been in that neij^-hborhood. 
Finally, the full letter of obedience to Rosecrans' order was 
followed when he "assumed a threatening attitude" by the forma- 
tion of his line to resist pursuit and protect the withdrawal. This 
alignment extended from the head of McFarland's Gap to the 
Lafayette road and Cloud House, nearly to Rossville Gap. This 
alignment was completed about 5 : 'M) P. AL, and shortly there- 
after (leneral Rosecrans" second dispatch, sent through the 
medium of General Garfield, again ordered him to retire on 
Rossville, provided his troo])s were "retiring in good order." 
General Granger was present with Thomas, and here learned 
for the first time Rosecrans' command to retreat to Rossville. 
(Page 1-15, Gracie.) 

Colonel Gracie adds, 'Tt was also in the vicinity of the 

Cloud House that (General Sheridan at 5 : -■)() P. M. reported his 

arrival on Thomas' left. '■■ * * He had received a terril)le 

beating at noon time on the extreme rit;ht fiank of the army. 

snfl'ering a loss of over .".0 per cent, yet he gathered and rallied 

in thj woods more than half the scattered remnants and brought 

them into line again at the extreme left liank of the army, ready 

Iiefore sundown to go into action again. Sheridan's statement is 

that when he reported to General Thomas for action the latter 

replied that his lines were too disorganized and withdrriwa! was 

necessary." lliere is no shadow of doubt that Sheridan marched 

to Rossville after the debacle of the morning, and obeving an 

18 



order sent by Rosecrans from Chattanooga at 5 P. M., he fol- 
lowed his original intention of moving out upon the Lafayette 
road, reaching a point three miles distant, where he halted on find- 
ing that it was too late to render assistance. Colonel Gracie states 
further that General Thomas, directed Sheridan, that ; "instead of 
advancing further "the 1500 gathered" should be reformed on the 
Lafayette road at Cloud House and aid in covering the with- 
drawal to Rossville." (Page 110, Gracie.) General Davis joined 
Thomas right by way of McFarland's Gap; too late, however, to 
take part in the engagement. 

In no part of his history does Colonel Gracie neglect to 
defend those who he thinks have been unappreciated or un- 
fairly criticised, nor does he permit those whom he believes to 
have been negligent of their responsibility to escape his reproof. 
He declares that N'egley's withdrawal of tlie two small regiments 
left him, in charge of the artillery reserve, was timely and judi- 
cious, for the guns might be, and probably would have been 
employed bv the enemy against our retreating columns ; that 
whole regiments were lost or imperilled by officers who employed 
them to cover the retreat of their own commands ; that many 
of those who were doing their whole duty in a courageous and 
faithful manner were censured and maligned; and all this without 
fear or favor. His readers must judge, from the authorities he 
quotes, how impartial he has been in discussing a vast number of 
vexed questions, v/hich up to this time have not been solved. 

About an hour after Granger had left McAfee's church to 
aid General Thomas with Steedman't brigade. Colonel Dan INIc- 
Cook, who was during the two days under the direct command 
of Granger and Thomas, and whose every movement met with 
the commendation of both, was ordered to report to Granger 
via the Lafayette road. As the brigade was about to pass the 
McDonald house, Colonel McCook ordered Captain Edward L. 

19 



.Vnderson, his adjutant, to hasten forward to announce the ap- 
proach of the command. Driven from the road b\' the fire of 
small arms and artillery Anderson turned to the ri,i;ht into the 
fields near McDonald's. Here he was met by Major Joseph 
I'^ullerton, of Grang-er's staff, waiting' for McCook. At this 
moment the brigade, w hieh had l)een marching by the right fiank 
without an advance guard, was driven from the road by the 
artillery of the enemy to the heights behind the McDonald house. 
Fullerton waited to see where McCook would take position, while 
Anderson galloped forward and foinid General Thomas under a 
large tree near the Snodgrass house. General Thomas was per- 
fectly calm, but Grang^er advancing from near by was weeping 
for the death of his Adjutant Russell, who had been killed but a 
few moments before in stationing Steedman's troops. This was 
about 2 p. m. Fullerton then arrived, and reported to Thomas 
that McCook's brigade, which he had noted from some distance, 
was posted on the crest of the ridge, apparently in perfect order. 
General Thomas remarked that "it was a happy chance, for 
McCook was just where he wanted him to protect our left fiank 
and rear" and directed Captain Anderson to go to McCook with 
orders to remain where he was and to hold the position. The 
wisflom of this decision was shown later in a remarkable manner, 
for it proved the rescue of the army, as will afterwards appear, 
and McCook's brigade, by offering a threatening front in a 
commanding: position and by the use of its battery, performed 
greater service than it did even in the g-lorious Atlanta cam- 
paig'u, when out of a brigade averaging: about two thousand men 
it lost, at Kenesaw, Peachtree Creek, Jonesboro, and in man\- 
smaller engagements, three commanders and 1089 good soldiers, 
killed or wounded. No ofificer, staff, or other, placed McCook 
upon the crest of Cloud I Till, as every member of the command 
well knew. His troops were simply driven from the road, and 
under the Colonel's hurried orders soug;ht tho cre^:t of thi hiil 

20 



which so timely and nuexpectedly offered itself; the movemeni 
was an unpremeditated unforeseen affair, that was as quickly 
begun as the report of the first gun sounded, and the men answered 
as readily, but in an orderly manner. 

Rosecrans' despatch directing Thomas to withdraw the army, 
and form a defensive line with Crittenden and McCook whom 
the Commander in Chief supposed to be somewhere in Thomas' 
rear, was sent from Chattanooga at 4 : 15 p. m., and was re- 
ceived before five o'clock as we knew from actual and constructive 
time. General Thomas immediately repaired to Kelly's field to 
hasten the movement. Rut a singular state of affairs had taken 
place in the left wing before Thomas' arrival. For some hours 
previously no word had been received from Thomas, and a consul- 
tation had taken place between the four division commanders 
and other officers of rank regarding the condition of their com- 
mands. This is not described in Gracie's book, but it is too 
important to pass over. 

"There had been no intimation to the four commanders on 
the left — Baird, Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds — that everything 
had not gone well with the right. They could get no message 
from Thomas for two or three hours. At this juncture, fearing 
another assault by the Confederates, and supposing that Thomas 
had been cut off from them. Palmer. Johnson and Reynolds con- 
sulted with P>aird and proposed that Palmer, as senior ranking- 
officer, be placed in command of their four divisions and march 
them off the field. But Baird refused to join them, preventing 
this calamitv." (Chattanooga Campaign, Col. M. H. Fitch, 
I'aird's Inspector General, Page 111). 

"About this time it was quiet on our front, and quite a num- 
ber of general officers were congregated discussing the condition 
of the fight, among them two Major Generals, Reynolds and 

21 



Palmer ; and it was urged that we ought to have a general com- 
mander for our four divisions. Reynolds, the senior declined 
positively to assume it, remarking that it would be only assuming 
a disaster which was certainly impending." (A Military Xarra- 
tive, by General W. H: Hazen, page 131.) 

''The commander of one of the divisions near my own, a])- 
proachcd me and said I was the ranking officer on the field, and 
that I ought to order a retreat of the' divisions on the left to 
Chattanooga. At the moment the prospect did appear gloomy, 
and 1 was inclined to apprehend that matters were as bad as 
he supposed them to be. I told him, however, that if it was true 
that the rebels had defeated our right and center of the army, and 
captured or ki!le.l Rosecrans, Thomas. McCook and Crittenden, 
so far as I was concerned they might have every man of the 
four divisions they could take; that we would cut our way to 

Chattanooga ; that I would rather be killed, and be d d, than 

to be (1 d by the country for leaving a battle-field under such 

circumstances." Personal Recollection's of General John AI. 
Palmer, pp. 18:)-184. 

Shortly after this consultation, Ilazen was given permission 
to take his P)rigade to look for the right wing. About o'o'clock 
he came upon Marker's "Hard pressed brigade," on the open crest 
about the Snodgrass house, a few hundred yards in rear of his 
original position on the east hill of bForseshoe Ridge, whence he 
had Ixen driven about five o'clock by General Archibald Gracie 
who had gallantly taken possession of the long .sought point of 
advantage. Ilazen who had skirnn'shed over from Kellv's field 
with a front of two regiments, together with TIarker and a sec- 
tion of the ISth Ohio P>attery checked the enemy's ])iu-suit. Here 
( )p(lycke, "the braves^t of the brave" was conspicuous in his gal- 
lantry and his regiment, the 125th Ohio and the section of the 

22 



18th Ohio Battery, formed the last fighting line. Steedman had 
fallen back from the main ridge, with Bushrod Johnson between 
him and the Horseshoe. Brannan exposed on both flanks, was 
the last to leave the crest, retiring in rear of Snodgrass House ; 
and by six o'clock the enemy had full possession of the strong- 
hold so faithfully defended. 

That is to say, the whole of the Horseshoe Ridge was in pos- 
session of the brigades of Trigg, Kelly and Gracie, the only Fed- 
erals remaining being the three captured regiments, 89th Ohio, 21st 
Ohio, and 22nd Michigan, and a temporary stand of the 9th 
Indiana, which Gracie alleges had been sent to take possession 
of the middle hill, and that Brannan did this to distract the at- 
tention of the enemy, as was his abandonment of the captured 
re?-iments. to cover the "stealthy" withdrawal of his troops. 

When, about 4 : 30 p. m., General Thomas reached the 
southern edge of Kelly's field he found Reynolds already mov- 
ing ofif in column of fours, while beyond him a compact body of 
the enemy was passing south towards the rear of Baird, Johnson 
and Palmer. General Thomas at once commanded Reynolds to 
form line, face to the rear, and charge on the advancing foe. 
Turchin now made the charge which should live in history, as 
with wild cheers his brigade fell upon the Confederates and drove 
them more than a mile, uncovering the other three divisions. 
Barnett's Battery, of Dan McCook's brigade, aided Turchin in 
this attack and covered his retreat, when Reynolds and his troops 
found "shelter" behind McCook's brigade. Here were also the 
brigades of Robinson and Willich, and with these three commands 
General Thomas formed the nucleus of that front upon the line of 
hills that permitted the remainder of the army to withdraw by 
way of the "Ridge Road," to McFarland's Gap and Rossville. 

23 



Had AlcCook's brigade not been interrupted in its march to 
the front by an enemy which drove it to "the commanding' posi- 
tion" south of the Cloud House; who can say what would have 
been the fate of the Army of the Cumberland? Had 'l\irchin 
failed to return, the Confederates would have crushed tjic left 
wing in ilank and poured masses in rear of the gallant men who 
had held the Horseshoe Ridge. Colonel Oracle remarks (p. 114), 
"It can not be doubted that this position occupied by AlcCook's 
lirigade and I'arnett's Battery was developed into one of the 
most important keys to the safety of tlie whole I'ederal army, 
holding in check cavalry, infantry and artillery forces of the Con- 
federate right. For on the Confederate right, Forrest's Cavalry 
and troops of IVeckenridge's and Liddell's Divisions overlapped 
the I'Vderal left under Baird. Steedman's opportune arrival had 
pushed aside F^orrest's dismounted cavalry, thus preventing the 
junction via ATcFarland's Gap and the two Confederate wings; 
and nothing but McCook's Brigade and Barnett's B.atterv re- 
mained beh.ind after Stecdman to guard this threatened catas- 
trophe — the surrounding of the Federal armv and blocking its 
withdrawal through the passes to Rossville." For these services 
tlie l)rigade was handsomely commended by General Thomas. 

"They also serve who only stand and wait." 

A few more words about the withdrawal of the troops from 

the field. It has been officially reported that no command except 

the Ijrigade of Col. Cruft had the good fortune to L'ave Kelly's 

field in perfect order. Johnson was fighting at the time the 

order came, but his right was exposed and he had to obev. and 

reports that he owed the safety of his command to Willich's 

masterly movements ; ]^)air(rs division which had borne much 

of the burden of the two days, owing to his exposed position on 

the extreme left of the line, again suffered severelv in killed, 

24 



wounded and prisoners ; one of Grose's regimental officers on the 
left reported that his command had been crushed, so that Grose, 
Palmer and Thomas were forced to recognize that Grose retired 
in "some confusion," when we know from the reports that the 36th 
Indiana and 6th Ohio withdrew in line of battle and turned to 
fight (as many of the men have told the writer) ; but Cruft goes 
down in history through his various superiors as having with- 
drawn in perfect order. It is evident from his report that Cruft, 
seeing Reynolds' retreat, left the line before the last attack, 
which shattered Grose's left, and he therefore had a mere parade 
in reaching the shelter of the woods. (O. R. 50, p. 733). There 
was more or less confusion in all the other divisions, after Rey- 
nolds withdrew. 

After the troops from Kelly's field were on the road to 
McFarland's Gap, the heroes of the Horseshoe Ridge were safely 
withdrawn, except three regiments. (21st and 89th Ohio and 23nd 
Michigan) which were not notified to retreat and were captured, 
and the 9th Indiana narrowly escaped when it was ordered to 
make a vain endeavor to regain Hill No. 2, (the middle one) ; 
and the last shots firxl at Chickamauga were between Lieut. Col 
Henry V. N. Boynton's 35th Ohio and the 6th Florida. Henry 
V. N. P.oynton was a gallant and efficient officer, a medal of 
honor man. one who distinguished himself on many fields. 

Hazen followed th? troops through McFarland's Gap as 
rear guard. Col. Dan McCook's Brigade was the last command 
to leave the field of Chickamauga, sending two six gun discharges 
from Barnett's Battery, in the spirit of defiance, by the personal 
orders of Granger, characteristic of that erratic officer, who 
appeared on foot about 6 p. m. An hour earlier General Baird 
surprised McCook by the information that the whole army was 
being withdrawn from the field. At 8 o'clock McCook's Brigade 

25 



4 

retired, unuTolcsted to Rossville, reaching its bivouac about mid- 
night ; or later. (See H. J. Aten's admirable Mistory of the 
85th Illinois). 

In February, 18()5, the author of this review, on his return 
from the Battle of Nashville, i)aid a visit to General Scott, in 
company with his uncle, Robert Anderson, a former aide-de-camp 
to the old Chieftan. General Scott was enthusiastic in his praise 
of Thomas, and turning to my uncle, said, "Robert, you have 
alwa\s known my opinion of George Thomas. Xow 1 wish to 
say that, in my opinion, the Battle of Xashville was the finest piece 
of grand tactics of the Civil War." Had Scott lived to know all 
the mysteries, now revealed, of the great IJattle of Chickamauga, 
such as the defence of the Horseshoe Ridge, of the charge per- 
sonally demanded of Rexnold's Brigade, of the successful with- 
drawal of the troops in the face of a victorious enemw of the 
quickly arranged stand at the head of McFarland's Gaj), in what 
words could he have expressed his opinion of the strategv and 
tactics )f his old favorite, who had proved himself one of the 
greatest Captains of modern times. 

Thomas' genius seemed to render him prescient, for he was 
always present at the critical moment, with a coolness that gave 
him instant, perfect control of his best judgment. 

Truly, as Colonel Graeie remarks, "As the leader of the 
Federal Army, in its escape from com])lete annihilation, he re- 
ceived the crown of glory to which lu was entitled."- 

While Colonel Gracie's book may not give the last word 
about the battle of Chickamauga. it exhibits a conscientious and 
laborious effort to harmonize and reconcile the man\' statements 
regarding this great conflict into a fair and acceptable narrative, 
in which it must be admitted he has succeeded most creditablv. 



He has gone to the Official Reports and to reputable witnesses 
for his facts, and whether or no we accept all his deductions, we 
have before us Tlic Truth About Chickamaui^a as it is understood 
by an impartial observer. 

NOTE — The following named commands and fragments — 
some of which were mere squads, but which did honor to their 
regiments — fought on Horseshoe and the connecting Main Ridge 
from about 2 :30 p. m. to 4 :00 p. m., September 20th, 1863. 

Beginning on the right (west) ; Steedman's Division, con- 
sisting of Colonel John G. Mitchell's and General Walter Whit- 
taker's splendid brigades, 22nd Michigan, 21st Ohio, General 
Van Derveer's invincible troops, 87th Indiana, 58th Indiana, 17th 
Kentucky, 9th Kentucky, 19th Ohio, 79th Indiana. 14th Ohio, 4th 
Kentucky, 10th Kentucky, 13th Ohio, 19th Illinois, 18th Ohio, 
11th Michigan, 44th Indiana, Harker's brigade on the extreme 
left (east). Generals Steedman, Brannon, Wood and John Beatty 
were with their troops, and the divisions of Negley and Van 
Cleve were represented. The 18th Ohio battery, Lieut, Frank G. 
Smith, 4th U. S. Artillery, was on a line with the Snodgrass 
House. 




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